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Abstract
A class of non cooperative games characterized by a `congestion eect' is studied,
in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria,
the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy proles maximizing the
potential function coincide. The structure of the class is investigated and it turns
out that this class constitutes a cone. Remarks on strictly strong Nash equilibria
and relaxations are provided.




In recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of specic classes of non
cooperative games for which there exist pure strategy Nash equilibria. One of the pio-
neering papers is Rosenthal (1973), and Monderer and Shapley (1993) have shown that
the existence of a pure equilibrium in these games relies on the possibility of construct-
ing a potential function. In their study of the general class of games which possess this
property, Monderer and Shapley have also dened an equilibrium renement concept, the
potential maximizer, and have shown the validity of the ctitious play property (1996).
Milchtaich (1994) and Quint and Shubik (1994), on the other hand, have proved the ex-
istence of a pure Nash equilibrium for a class of congestion games which, dierently from
Rosenthal's one, does not in general admit a potential function. Konishi, Le Breton and
Weber (1995), considering the same model as Milchtaich, have even shown the existence
of a strong Nash equilibrium.
The situation we are going to consider can be described, for example, by the foraging
behaviour of a population of identical bees in a eld of owers. In deciding which ower
to visit, each insect will take into account the quantity of nectar available and the num-
ber of bees already on the ower, because, as is intuitively clear, the more crowded the
source of nectar, the less food is available per capita. In economics this kind of problems
is studied in the literature on local public goods, where it is common to speak about
\anonymous crowding"1 to describe the negative externality arising from the presence
of more than one user of the same facility. Another example is the problem faced by a
set of unemployed workers who have to decide where to emigrate to get a job. Dierent
countries are more or less attractive depending on the conditions of the local labour
market and, on the other hand, a crowding out eect reduces the appeal of emigrating.
We introduce a variation on the models of Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (Milchtaich)
and Rosenthal (Monderer and Shapley) and describe a class of congestion games that
provides interesting results. In particular, it will be shown that there exists for each
game in this class a strong Nash equilibrium and, moreover, it turns out that the set of
Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of potential
maximizing strategy proles.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we investigate the various models men-
tioned above, clarifying the similarities and dierences among them. After that we dene
a class of games which possesses a strong Nash equilibrium and at the same time admit
a potential function in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1993). In section 3 we anal-
1See for example Wooders (1989).
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yse the geometric properties of this family of games, showing that it can be represented
by a nitely generated cone. In section 4 we state our main theorems concerning the
coincidence of equilibrium sets, where the representation of each game as an element of
a cone is used. Attention is focused at the computation of the potential. This section is
concluded by comments on strictly strong equilibria. The implications of relaxing some
of our assumptions underlying the congestion eect are discussed in section 5.
2 Congestion games
The games introduced by Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (KLW, 1995), Milchtaich (1994)
and Quint and Shubik (QS, 1994) are rather similar, in the sense that the utility functions
of the players are characterized by some kind of \congestion eect". On the other hand
however, the slightly dierent assumptions lead to quite dierent results, as we are going
to see.
Before introducing and comparing the dierent models, we need to specify some notation.
Let G = hN; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2Ni be a normal form game, where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is the
nite set of players,Xi is the nite strategy space of player i and ui : X :=
Q
j2N Xj ! IR
is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function which assigns to each strategy prole
x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 X a payo ui(x).
The various classes of games we are going to discuss are identied by means of dierent
sets of properties concerning the structure of the strategic interaction. In particular,
KLW assume that the following assumptions (P1)-(P4) are satised
(P1) There exists a nite set F such that Xi = F for all players i 2 N .
We call the set F the \facility set" and a strategy for player i is choosing an element out
of F .
(P2) For each strategy prole x 2 X and all players i; j 2 N :
if xi 6= xj and x
0
j 2 Xj such that xi 6= x
0
j, then ui(xj; x j) = ui(x
0
j; x j).
KLW call this assumption independence of irrelevant choices and the meaning is that for
each player i 2 N and each strategy prole x the utility of i will not be altered if the set
of players that choose the same facility is not modied.
Denote now by nf(x) the number of users of facility f in the strategy prole x. Then
the third property dened by KLW can be stated as follows
(P3) For each player i 2 N and all strategy proles x; y 2 X, with xi = yi:
if ng(x) = ng(y) for all g 2 F , then ui(x) = ui(y).
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This anonymity condition reects the idea that the payo of player i depends on the
number of players choosing the facilities, rather than on their identity. The fourth
assumption, called partial rivalry, states that each player i would not regret that other
players, choosing the same facility, would select another one. Formally:
(P4) For each player i 2 N , each strategy prole x 2 X, each player j 6= i such that
xj = xi and each x
0
j 6= xi, ui(xj; x j)  ui(x
0
j; x j).
Though Milchtaich (1994) introduces his model in a slightly dierent way, the resulting
class of games is essentially the same. More specically he introduces the conditions
(P1), (P4) and the following further assumption
(P2') For each player i 2 N and all proles x; y with xi = yi = f , if nf(x) = nf(y), then
ui(y) = ui(x).
In other words the utility of player i depends only on the number of users of the same
facility he has chosen. It is straightforward to prove (assuming (P1)) that (P2') implies
both (P2) and (P3), while we show that the reverse implication is true in the following
Lemma 2.1 . Any game G = hN; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2Ni satisfying (P1), (P2) and (P3)
satises (P1) and (P2').
Proof:Take a game G = hN; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2Ni satifying (P1), (P2) and (P3). Let i 2 N ,
x; y 2 X such that xi = yi = f and furthermore assume that nf(x) = nf (y). According






xi if xj = xi
xk otherwise






xi if yj = xi
xk otherwise
Notice that for each g 2 F , ng(xi; x
0
 i) = ng(xi; y
0





 i). Therefore, ui(xi; x i) = ui(xi; x
0
 i) = ui(xi; y
0
 i) = ui(yi; y i). 2
KLW and Milchtaich independently proved the following
Theorem 2.1 Each normal form game hN; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2Ni satisfying (P1), (P2), (P3)
and (P4), possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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This is already a quite interesting result, but KLW went even further, showing
Theorem 2.2 For each game satisfying (P1), (P2) (P3) and (P4), the set of strong
Nash equilibria is non empty.
Recall that, given a normal form game G = hN; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2Ni, a strategy prole x is
called a strong Nash equilibrium if for every S  N and all strategy proles yS, there
is at least one player i 2 S such that ui(yS ; x S)  ui(x). We denote the set of strong
Nash equilibria of a given game G by SNE(G). Likewise the set of Nash equilibria is
written as NE(G).
Notice that in general the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed.
Finally, we mention the model introduced by Quint and Shubik (1994), where the as-
sumption that all players have the same set of facilities is relaxed. This new condition
is dened as follows
(P1') There exists a facility set F such that for each i 2 N , Xi  F .
Similar to Lemma 2.1 one can prove that a game G satises (P1'), (P2) and (P3) if and
only if it satises (P1') and (P2').
QS are able to show
Theorem 2.3 For all strategic games satisfying (P1'), (P2') and (P4) there exists a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
All the classes we have considered till now lack the potential property. Rosenthal (1973)
studied a family of strategic interactions characterized by a congestion eect, which turns
out to be isomorphic to the class of potential games. Instead of discussing his model,
we briey mention some results out of the Monderer and Shapley papers. Let us recall
some preliminary denitions and properties.
Denition 2.1 (Monderer and Shapley, (1993)).
A strategic form game G = hN; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N i is said to be a potential game if there
exists a function P : X ! IR such that for all i 2 N , xi; x
0
i 2 Xi and x i 2
Q
j 6=iXj
it holds that ui(xi; x i)  ui(x
0
i; x i) = P (xi; x i)  P (x
0
i; x i).
The function P is called a potential for G.
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In other words, the potential function measures the dierence in utility induced by a
unilateral deviation. If a game admits a potential function, the potential is unique up
to a constant. Notice that a potential maximizing strategy prole is certainly a Nash
equilibrium and therefore each nite potential game possesses a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. The set of strategy proles maximizing the potential function of a given
potential game G is denoted by PM(G) = fx 2 XjP (x)  P (y) for all y 2 Xg. For an
axiomatic approach to the potential maximizer we refer to Potters, Peleg and Tijs (1994).
Consider now the following assumption
(P1") For each player i 2 N;Xi 2 2
F , Xi 6= ;.
It means that each player has to choose among strategies which are given by a subset of
the original facility set.
A symmetry condition describes the fact that the payos are player-independent, i.e.
players who encounter each other by choosing the same facility obtain the same utility.
(P5) For each player i; j 2 N and every strategy prole x 2 X such that xi = xj,
ui(x) = uj(x).
Monderer and Shapley (1993) proved
Theorem 2.4 Each nite potential game is isomorphic to a game that satises the
properties (P1"), (P2), (P3) and (P5).
As can be easily seen by means of Prisoner's Dilemma, potential games do not in general
possess a strong Nash equilibrium. Since we want to describe games that satisfy the
potential property and have strong Nash equilibria, we restrict ourselves to strategic
interactions that satisfy properties (P1), (P2), (P3), (P4) and (P5). We will denote the
class of (congestion) games which satisfy (P1) up to (P5) by C.
3 On the structure of the class C
In the previous section we have dened the class C. In this section we are going to
analyse its structure. Let C(n) denote the subclass with n players. It will be shown that
each game G = hN; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2Ni 2 C(n) can be identied with a nite set of vectors
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in IRn+, and that the subclass C(F; n), consisting of all games with xed facility set F ,
is a nitely generated cone in (IRn+)
F . The vector notation of the games simplies the
proofs of the theorems on strong equilibria and the potential maximizer we are going to
present in paragraph 4 and 5. A simple example at the end of this section shows the
existence of strong equilibria in a specic game.
Fix a number n 2 IN and a nite set F . Recall that for a game G 2 C(F; n) the utility
functions are not player-specic and can be assumed to be induced by the functions
wf , f 2 F , where wf : f1; : : : ; ng ! IR and wf(t) is the utility assigned to each player
choosing facility f, if exactly t players choose it, for each t 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Moreover, for
each facility f 2 F the function wf : f1; :::; ng ! IR is such that wf(t)  wf(t + 1) for
all t 2 f1; :::; n   1g. For convenience and without loss of generality we assume that
wf (t)  0 for all t. This means that the game G 2 C(F; n) is described by jF j vectors of
the form (wf (1); :::; wf(n)),f 2 F , in the set V = fv = (v1; :::; vn) 2 IR
n
+jvt  vt+1 for all
t 2 f1; : : : ; n  1gg.
Proposition 3.1 The set V is a nitely generated cone in IRn+. The extreme directions
of V are the vectors b1;b2; : : : ;bn with bi = (1; 1; 1; 1| {z }
i
; :::; 0). Furthermore, dim(V ) = n.
Proof:The vectors b1 = (1; 0; 0; :::; 0), bi = (1; 1; 1; 1| {z }
i
; :::; 0),..., bn = (1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1) are
elements of V and each vector v 2 V can be uniquely written as a positive combination










Since det(Bn) = 1, we see that the equation Bn = v has exactly one solution for each
v 2 IRn+. Clearly,  is positive because of the decreasingness property of v. The set V is































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The extreme directions of the cone C(Bn) are the vectors b
i, i 2 f1; :::; ng. This cone
has furthermore the property that its dimension is the number of extreme directions. In
other words we have that dim C(Bn) = rank(Bn) = n. 2
Essentially we proved
Corollary 3.1 The class of games C(F; n) can be identied with a cone in (IRn+)
F and
dim(C(F; n)) = jF j  n.
In next example we are going to consider an extreme game of C(F; n), i.e. a game with
facility set F such that wf is an extreme direction in the cone V for each f 2 F .
Example 3.1 Let G be a game in C(ff; gg; 4) such that wf = (1; 0; 0; 0) and wg =
(1; 1; 0; 0).
Nash equilibria are either those strategy proles in which one of the players chooses f
and the other three g, or those in which both facilities are chosen by two players. These
situations will be depicted
( 1 ; 0; 0; 0)
(1; 1; 0 ; 0)
for the rst case and
(1; 0 ; 0; 0)
(1; 1 ; 0; 0)
for the second one, where the numbers in the square boxes indicate the payo received by
each player choosing this facility. Notice furthermore that the players are interchangeable
9
as suggested by the symmetry condition (P5), which therefore guarantees that the Nash
equilibria are also symmetric. One easily checks that all Nash equilibria are strong.
4 Strong Nash equilibria and the potential maxi-
mizer
In this section we prove our main theorem:
Theorem 4.1 On the class C of games, SNE = NE = PM .
A proof of this result is given in parts. Recall that for any game in normal form G,
SNE(G)  NE(G) and that for any potential game G, PM(G)  NE(G). It is there-
fore sucient to prove the following propositions.
Proposition 4.1 For each game G 2 C, NE(G)  SNE(G).
Proposition 4.2 For each game G 2 C, NE(G)  PM(G).
The proofs will be given using the structure of the class of games described in the previous
section. We assume n 2 IN and a nite set F to be xed. Each game G 2 C(F; n) will
be given by the vectors
f(wf(1); :::; wf(n))gf2F
A strategy combination will be written, irrespective of the specic players, in the same
way as suggested in example 3.1. To each strategy prole x 2 FN an occupation number
nf (x) is related for each facility f 2 F , which depicts the number of users of that facility
w.r.t. x.
Proof:(Proposition 4.1).
Let G 2 C(F; n) be given by f(wf(1); : : : ; wf(n))gf2F and let x 2 NE(G). Suppose
S  N can strictly improve the payo for all its members by switching to a strat-
egy combination yS 2 F
S. Call the resulting strategy combination y = (yS; xNnS). If
nf (y) > nf (x) for some f 2 F , a player i 2 S exists such that xi = f and yi = g 6= f .
This implies wf (nf(x)+1)  wf(nf (y)) > wg(ng(y)) which contradicts the fact that x is
a Nash equilibrium. So nf (x) = nf (y) for all f 2 F . Therefore every player in S chooses
a new facility already chosen by a member of S and obtains a higher utility. Among
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the utilities assigned to members of S there is a maximum, since S is nite. Any player
in S rewarded with this maximum cannot get more in the new conguration. Hence a
contradiction arises. Every Nash equilibrium is strong. 2
Based upon the switching argument the next lemma shows the similarities in utilities
for dierent Nash equilibria.
Lemma 4.1 Let G 2 C(F; n) be determined by f(wf(1); : : : ; wf (n))gf2F and let x and
y be two Nash equilibria for the game G.
For all f , g 2 F such that nf(x) < nf(y) and ng(y) < ng(x):
wf (l) = wf (nf (y)) = wg(ng(x)) = wg(m)) for all l, m with nf (x) + 1  l  nf (y) and
ng(y) + 1  m  ng(x).
Proof:Let f , g and l, m be as described. Both x, y are equilibria and therefore
wf (nf(y))  wg(ng(y) + 1)  wg(m)  wg(ng(x))  wf (nf (x) + 1)  wf (l)  wf (nf (y))
2
A potential is given by the function P : X ! IR, where for each strategy combination





2 Notice that to compute this potential it is necessary to
add the utilities of the used facilities up to the number of users. This means that in each
vector wf all the rst nf (x) numbers are added.
As a consequence it is clear that by n times choosing the facilities with highest re-
maining numbers, from left on, in the set of vectors
f(wf(1); :::; wf(n))gf2F
a potential maximizing prole is found.
Example 4.1 Let G 2 C(ff; g; hg; 4) such that
wf = (4; 3; 2; 1)
wg = (5; 2; 1; 0)
wh = (1; 1; 0; 0)
Clearly the potential maximizing strategy combinations are those x 2 FN with nf (x) =
3, ng(x) = 1 and those with nf (x) = 2, ng(x) = 2. Notice that P (x) = 14 and that in
fact all Nash equilibria are potential maximizing.
2This is a modication of the formula given in Monderer and Shapley (1993).
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Proof:(Proposition 4.2).
It is sucient to show that P (x) = P (y) if x is a Nash equilibrium and y a potential
maximizing strategy combination. Suppose that x is a Nash equilibrium and that y is
a potential maximizing strategy combination. Facilities f 2 F such that nf (x) = nf (y)
add as much to P (x) as to P (y). Furthermore, by Lemma 4.1, if nf (x) < nf (y) and
ng(y) < ng(x) for certain f; g 2 F then wf (l) = wf (nf (y)) = wg(ng(x)) = wg(m) for
all l 2 fnf (x) + 1; : : : ; nf(y)g and m 2 fng(y) + 1; : : : ; ng(x)g The total contribution
of the facilities in the set ff 2 F j nf (x) 6= nf (y)g to the potentials P (x) and P (y) is
apparently the same. 2
In the last part of this section we discuss the existence of strictly strong Nash equilibria
in the class C of games. Recall that given a game hN; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2Ni, a strategy prole
x 2 X is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium if for all coalitions S  N and strategy
combinations yS, ui(yS; x S) = ui(x) for all i 2 S or ui(yS; x S) < ui(x) for at least one
i 2 S. Notice that the set of strictly strong Nash equilibria is a subset of the set of strong
Nash equilibria. In particular the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium does not guar-
antee the existence of a strictly strong one as can be seen in the following counterexample.
Example 4.2 Consider the game G 2 C(ff; gg; 3)
wf = (4; 2 ; 0)
wg = ( 3 ; 2; 1)
where, as usual, the squared numbers depict a (strong) Nash equilibrium payo.
If the two players choosing f agree that one of them switches to g and the other one
sticks to f , the utility will still be 2 for the switching one but increases from 2 to 4 for
the remaining player. A similar argument holds for the strong Nash equilibria given by
( 4 ; 2; 0)
(3; 2 ; 1)
5 Relaxations of the model
The class C is characterized by properties (P1), (P2), (P3), (P4) and (P5). It is obvious
that relaxations of those properties will have consequences on the results presented in
section 4. In particular we discuss what are the consequences of replacing (P1) by (P1').
12
For the model of Konishi, Le Breton and Weber this relaxation was considered by Quint
and Shubik.
First we make some remarks regarding strong equilibria and the potential maximizer
in the class which results by not assuming the crowding eect property (P4).
Denote by CP the class of normal form games which satisfy the properties (P1), (P2),
(P3) and (P5). Each n person game G in CP is a potential game and can be represented
by a set of (arbitrary) vectors f(wf(1); : : : ; wf(n))gf2F . It is obvious that not for every
game G 2 CP strong Nash equilibria will exist. But even the existence of a strong Nash
equilibrium for a game G does not guarantee that each Nash equilibrium is strong too,
nor that the strong equilibrium is a potential maximizer. Next examples shows a game
G 2 CP such that ; 6= SNE(G)  NE(G) and SNE(G) \ PM(G) = ;.
Example 5.1 Let G 2 CP be the following 3 person game with facilities f and g.
wf = (4; 0; 5 )
wg = (4; 2; 0)
A Nash equilibrium is depicted. It is certainly the only strong Nash equilibrium (up
to symmetry), but the maximal potential arises at the non strong equilibria which are
given by
( 4 ; 0; 5)
(4; 2 ; 0)
Consider now the class of games C0 constituted by (P1'),(P2),(P3),(P4) and (P5).
The result on the existence of strong Nash equilibria is still valid and furthermore it can
be shown that
Theorem 5.1 For all G 2 C 0, NE(G) = SNE(G).
Proof:The proof resembles that of Proposition 4.1 and will therefore be omitted. 2
In this class of games, the set of potential maximizing strategy combinations does not,
in general, coincide with the set of Nash equilibria, as can be seen in the following coun-
terexample.
Example 5.2 Consider the game G 2 C0(ff; g; hg; 5). Assume that three players have
strategy set ff; hg and two fg; hg. The payo vectors are
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wf = (4; 2; 1 ; 0; 0)
wg = ( 3 ; 2; 0; 0; 0)
wh = ( 2 ; 1; 1; 0; 0)
where, as usual, the squared numbers depict a Nash equilibrium payo. It represents
strategy combinations in which the three players with strategy set ff; hg all play f .
Consider now the equilibrium payo in which two of those three play f and the other
plays h.
wf = (4; 2 ; 1; 0; 0)
wg = (3; 2 ; 0; 0; 0)
wh = ( 2 ; 1; 1; 0; 0)
The potential associated to such Nash equilibrium is higher than the previous one.
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